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Two Equations on the Pareto-Efficient Sharing of Real GDP Risk 
By David Eagle and Lars Christensen 
 
This paper focuses on some theoretical findings concerning the optimal sharing of one of 
the most important systematic1 risks related to recessions – the risk concerning the level of real 
GDP (RGDP) in the economy.  Other recession risks, such as the systematic component of 
unemployment risk, are closely correlated with RGDP risk.  Theoretically, in pure exchange 
economies with no storage or financial capital, RGDP risk is the only systematic risk.  Even in 
our actual economies with storage and capital, RGDP risk is still the primary source of 
systematic risk (See Chen, Roll, and Ross, 1986).  Hence, many economists such as Athanasoulis 
and Shiller (2001) have been concerned about RGDP risk and how that risk should be shared.  
Several economists (e.g., Shiller, 2002, and Koenig, 2011) have found certain results that occur 
for specific classes of utility functions, in particular CARA utility functions.  The two equations 
discussed in this paper show that these results are due, not to a particular utility function per se, 
but rather on how one individual’s relative risk aversion compares to another individual’s 
relative risk aversion. 
How economic agents share risk have many applications in economics and finance 
including asset pricing, insurance, and monetary economics.  Futures, options, swaps and other 
financial derivatives have been created supposedly to facilitate the sharing of risk.  Prior to the 
2008 Financial Crisis, some economists (e.g., Kumar, 2007) have gone so far to say that these 
financial derivatives have helped complete markets in the sense of Arrow-Debreu.  However, 
most economic agents were impacted by the recession that followed the 2008 Financial Crisis 
                                               
1
 We use the term “systematic risk” as used in financial economics to represent the risk that cannot be diversified 
away.  Other terms for systematic risk are undiversifiable risk and market risk. 
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despite the existence of these financial derivatives.  In fact, some of these financial derivatives 
contributed to the 2008 Financial Crisis (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011). 
 By diversifying over a large base of customers, private insurance contracts handle much 
of the economy’s idiosyncratic risk (also known as diversifiable risk, unsystematic risk or unique 
risk).  However, for complete markets to occur in the sense of Arrow-Debreu, economic agents 
also need to be able to transfer systematic risks among themselves.  Many would consider 
futures, options, swaps and other financial derivatives to be appropriate vehicles for transferring 
these systematic risks. 
The aggregate risks related to recessions would be systematic because the whole 
economy is affected, which means you cannot eliminate this risk by diversifying from within that 
economy.2  However, as Shiller (1993) and Athanasoulis andShiller (2001) note, rather than 
transferring risk associated with recessions, financial derivative securities have focused on more 
specific risks such as equity-market risks or interest-rate risks.  Most of those using these 
derivatives to transfer risk are professional investors, banks, farmers or other businesses.  Other 
than unemployment insurance, which is usually handled by government agencies, very few of 
these derivatives are used directly by consumers to transfer their risks related to recessions. 
The importance of how to share RGDP risk is now even more important given the 
renewed interest by monetary economists in replacing interest-rate targeting with nominal GDP 
targeting.  As Koenig (2011) points out, an important issue concerning whether NGDP targeting 
is optimal or not depends on how different groups (such as borrowers and debtors) should share 
in RGDP risk. 
                                               
2
 One could reduce some RGDP risk through international diversifying as suggested by Shiller (1995).  However, 
for close economies or for the whole world economy, no further diversifying is possible.  The two equations 
presented in this paper are derived in the context of a closed economy. 
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The ultimate economic-theoretical basis for how risk should be shared is the Arrow-
Debreu economy with securities that address every possible contingency, a situation economists 
label as “complete markets.”  An Arrow-Debreu economy with state-contingent securities is 
Pareto efficient because it does have complete markets.  Therefore, this paper uses such an 
economy to derive two equations that relate an individual’s coefficient of relative risk aversion to 
how that individual will share RGDP risk under complete markets, i.e. when the economy is 
Pareto efficient.  The first equation is a slight extension of a formula derived by Domian and 
Eagle (2005).  The second equation is a generalization and reinterpretation of Koenig’s (2011) 
formula (4).  Both equations produce the same result, but have slightly different interpretations. 
The purposes of the main body of this paper are (i) to present these two formulas, (ii) to 
discuss the interpretations of these formulas, (iii) to discuss how the formulas are similar yet 
different, and (iv) to apply these formulas to the issue of Nominal GDP targeting.  We relegate 
the derivations of these formula to the appendix. 
 
I. Domian and Eagle’s RGDP-sharing Formula: 
The first formula for the Pareto-efficient sharing of RGDP risk is a slight extension of the 
formula from Domian and Eagle (2005).  This formula is: 
t
t
jtjt
jt
Y
dY
c
cd
α~
1
~
~
=  (1) 
where jtα~  is how individual j’s coefficient of relative risk aversion compares to the weighted 
average coefficient of relative risk aversion over all consumers.  The Yt in equation (1) represents 
the aggregate output (RGDP) at time t, and )(~ tjt Yc  is how j’s Pareto efficient consumption 
depends on RGDP (Note: this is not individual j’s consumption function; this is not the 
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relationship between j’s consumption and j’s income; it is the relationship between j’s Pareto-
efficient consumption and aggregate output as measured by RGDP).  The “~” sign over a 
variable indicates that this function is a function of RGDP. 
The left side of equation (1) is individual j’s percent change in consumption, whereas the 
term 
t
t
Y
dY
 is the percent change in RGDP.  We derive equation (1) in the appendix.  One of the 
purposes of this section is to help readers interpret and utilize the equation.  We will do so with 
examples of three individuals E, A, and B respectively having average, above average, and 
below average risk aversion.  For individual E with average relative risk aversion, 1~ =Etα  and 
equation (1) states that E’s Pareto-efficient consumption will change by 1% whenever RGDP 
changes by 1%. 
Assume individual A’s relative risk aversion is twice the average relative risk aversion, 
i.e., 2~ =Atα ; then equation (1) states that A’s Pareto-efficient consumption will change by half a 
percent whenever RGDP changes by 1%.  Next, assume individual B’s relative risk aversion is 
half of the average relative risk aversion, i.e., 21~ =Btα ; equation (1) states that B’s Pareto-
efficient consumption will change by 2% whenever RGDP changes by 1%.  In essence, in an 
Arrow-Debreu economy, those individuals in the economy with above average relative risk 
aversion transfer some of their RGDP risk to those individuals with less-than-average relative 
risk aversion. 
 
II. Koenig’s RGDP-sharing Formula: 
The second formula for the Pareto-efficient sharing of RGDP risk is a generalization of 
Koenig’s (2011) formula.  This formula is: 
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where jtΦ
~
 is how j’s relative risk tolerance compares to the average relative risk tolerance.  We 
are following the precedence in some financial-economic literature (e.g., Alexander, 2008; 
Duffe, 2001; Shefrin, 2001) that an individual’s relative risk tolerance is defined as the reciprocal 
of that individual’s coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Again, we will use examples involving three individuals W, X, and Z, respectively 
having average, above average, and below average relative risk tolerance.  First, consider 
individual W with average relative risk tolerance, i.e., 1=Φ Xt .  Then, according to (2), W’s 
Pareto-efficient consumption will change by 1% when RGDP changes by 1%. 
 Next, assume individual X has a relative risk tolerance that is twice the average relative 
risk tolerance.  Then X’s Pareto-efficient consumption will change by 2% when RGDP changes 
by 1%.  On the other hand, if Z’s relative risk tolerance is half the average relative risk tolerance, 
then when RGDP changes by 1%, X’s Pareto-efficient consumption will change by only half a 
percent.  In a Pareto-efficient economy like an Arrow-Debreu economy, individuals with less-
than-average relative risk tolerance will transfer some of their RGDP risk to individuals with 
above-average relative risk tolerance. 
 
III. The Similarities but Technical Differences Between the Two Equations: 
Since one’s relative risk tolerance is the inverse of one’s relative risk aversion, at first 
glance equations (1) and (2) appear very similar.  While similar, there are some technical 
differences.  Equation (1) is a little easier to interpret because people are more familiar with the 
term “risk aversion” than “risk tolerance.”  However, equation (2) is actually technically more 
correct. 
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In equation (2), the weighted average relative risk tolerance is computed in a natural way: 
∑
=
Ψ
m
j jtt
jt
Y
c
1
~
1~
 (3) 
where jtΨ
~
 is individual j’s relative risk aversion and therefore jtΨ~1  is j’s relative risk tolerance.  
The natural weights to use in computing the weighted average of everyone’s relative risk 
tolerances are the ratios of each individual’s consumption to RGDP. 
 However, for equation (1), the weighted average of the relative risk aversion is computed 
as follows: 
jt
m
j t
jt
t dY
cd
Ψ⋅≡Ψ ∑
=
~
~
1
 (4) 
Instead of using the natural weights of one’s consumption to RGPD, this weighted average uses 
the weights of how one’s consumption changes when RGDP changes.  The weighted average in 
(4) is a legitimate weighted average, but it is not the natural weighted average. 
 Because equation (2) is based on a weighted average relative risk tolerance that uses 
natural weights whereas equation (1) is based on a weighted average relative risk aversion that 
uses unnatural weights, we conclude that equation (2) is technically superior to equation (1).  On 
the other hand, equation (1) may be more meaningful for many who are more familiar with the 
term “risk aversion” than “risk tolerance.” 
 While these two equations do differ, they do produce the same result.  Therefore, it 
follows that the coefficient jtjt α~1
~
=Φ  where jtΦ
~
 is how j’s relative risk tolerance compares to 
the weighted average relative risk tolerance and jtα~  is how j’s relative risk aversions compares to 
the weighted average relative risk aversion.  However, we should keep in mind that the weighted 
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average risk tolerance is the natural weighted average, whereas the weighted average relative risk 
aversion is a little convoluted. 
 Even if we want to speak in terms of relative risk aversion rather than relative risk 
tolerance, there is a way we can use Koenig’s (2011) derivation for the basis for equation (1).  
We can do so thinking about the average relative risk aversion as equation (3), which can be 
interpreted as the weighted harmonic average of the individual relative risk aversion coefficients 
(See Wikopedia, 2012). 
 
IV. Applying these Equation to Borrowers and Lenders and Nominal GDP Targeting: 
In this section, we illustrate an example of how one can apply equations (1) and (2).  We 
do so by studying the impacts of how different central-bank targets impact the RGDP sharing 
between borrowers and lenders, or more generally the payer and receiver of any prearranged 
nominal amount.  We will use equation (1) because of the greater understanding of the term “risk 
aversion,” but to be more technically correct; we will interpret jtα~  as being the ratio of j’s 
coefficient of relative risk aversion to the weighted harmonic average of the relative risk aversion 
coefficients as given by (3).  Hence, our interpretation of (1) is now tied to Koenig’s (2011) 
derivation of equation (2). 
Assume a borrower owes a prearranged nominal Xt payment to a lender at time t.  We 
consider four cases: 
Case 1: Both the borrower and lender have average relative risk aversion  
Case 2: Both the borrower and lender have the same relative risk average which may be 
higher or lower than average. 
Case 3: The borrower has above average relative risk aversion, and the lender has below 
average relative risk aversion. 
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Case 4: The borrower has below average relative risk aversion, whereas the lender has 
above average relative risk aversion. 
In our analysis, we assume that, other than the Xt nominal payment that the borrower 
must pay the lender, the net real incomes of both the borrower and the lender are proportional to 
RGDP.  One way this could happen is if these other incomes and expenses are nominal and the 
central bank successfully targets NGDP.  Also, realize that as long as the population does not 
change, then the average real income must be proportional to RGDP, because RGDP is not just 
real aggregate supply; it is also real aggregate income (average real income = RGDP/m where m 
is the number of individuals). 
Let us begin with case 1, where both the borrower and the lender have average relative 
aversion, which mean that 1~ =jtα .  Equation (1) imply that the consumption of both the 
borrower and the lender should change by 1% when RGDP changes by 1% (i.e., their 
consumptions must be proportional to RGDP).  When a 1% change in RGDP leads to a 1% in the 
borrower’s and lender’s other net real incomes, then their consumption will change by 1% if and 
only if the real value of the loan payment changes by 1%.  In other words, where ttt PXx /≡  is 
the real value of this loan payment, Pareto efficiency requires the following condition holds 
when both the borrower and the lender have average relative risk aversion: 
t
t
t
t
Y
dY
x
dx
=  (5) 
How the real value of that loan payment changes when RGDP changes, however, 
depends on what the central bank targets.  If the central bank successfully targets the price level 
or the inflation rate, the price level will not change when RGDP changes; therefore, the real 
value of the nominal loan payment will not change; therefore equation (1) will not be satisfied 
under inflation targeting or price-level targeting. 
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To see this in a more formal, mathematical, yet relatively simple sense, remember the 
equation of exchange (also called the quantity equation). which states that MtVt=Nt=PtYt where 
Mt is the money supply, Vt is income velocity, Nt is nominal aggregate spending as measured by 
Nominal GDP (NGDP), Pt is the price level, and Yt is RGDP.  Concentrating on the N=PY part of 
this equation, solve for Pt to get Pt=Nt/Yt.  This tells us that there are two and only two direct 
determinants of the price level: (i) nominal aggregate spending as measured by NGDP and 
(ii) aggregate output as measured by RGDP. 
Next take the logarithms of both sides of Pt=Nt/Yt and totally differentiate to get: 
t
t
t
t
t
t
Y
dY
N
dN
P
dP
−=  (6) 
Now take logarithms of both sides of the definition of the real payment, ttt PXx /≡ , and totally 
differentiate, treating Xt as a constant to get: 
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
N
dN
Y
dY
P
dP
x
dx
−=−=  (7) 
Remember that when both the borrower and lender have average relative risk aversion, 
equation (1) holds if and only if 
t
t
t
t
Y
dY
x
dx
= .  However, under successful price-level targeting or 
inflation targeting, the central bank will change NGDP to offset any changes in RGDP so that the 
price level will not change.  In other words, 0=−=
t
t
t
t
t
t
Y
dY
N
dN
P
dP
.  However, this makes the real 
value of the nominal payment not change when RGDP changes. 
Now consider successful NGDP targeting, which means nominal GDP will not change 
(i.e., dNt/Nt=0).  Substituting this into (7) gives (5), which means equation (1) holds.  In 
conclusion, successful NGDP targeting will result in the Pareto-efficient sharing of RGDP risk 
- 11 - 
 
between borrowers and lenders when both the borrowers and lenders have average relative risk 
aversion. 
Now consider case 2, where both the borrower and the lender have the same level of 
relative risk aversion, which may be below or above average.  Then equation (1) still requires 
that the borrower’s and lender’s consumption change by the same percentage.  However, when 
the central bank targets the price level or inflation and the real value of the loan payment is 
unchanged.  When RGDP drops by 1%, the borrower’s consumption will have to drop by more 
than 1% because the borrower’s other real net income will drop by 1%, but the real value of the 
borrower’s payment to the lender will be unaffected.  Similarly, the lender’s consumption will 
drop less than 1%.  Therefore, successful price-level targeting or inflation targeting will not lead 
to efficient sharing of RGDP risk even when both the borrower and the lender have the same 
relative risk aversion that is below or above average. 
Now consider Case 3, where the borrower has above average relative risk aversion and 
the lender has below average relative risk aversion.  Then by equation (1) a 1% change in RGDP 
should cause the borrower’s consumption to change by less than 1%, and the lender’s 
consumption to change by more than 1%.  If the central bank successfully targeted the price level 
or inflation, then the borrower would be paying the lender a constant real payment to the lender.  
Therefore, when RGDP changes by 1%, the borrower’s consumption would change by more than 
1% and the lender’s consumption will change by less than 1%, the opposite of equation (1) 
requires.  Therefore, again successful price-level or inflation targeting works against the efficient 
sharing of RGDP risk. 
Finally, consider Case 4 where the borrower with below average risk aversion and the 
lender who has above average risk aversion.  When RGDP changes by 1%, then equation (1) 
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states that the borrower’s consumption should change by more than 1%, whereas the lender’s 
consumption should change by less than 1%.  That is what would happen under successful price-
level and inflation targeting. 
In conclusion, for price-level or inflation targeting to be consistent with optimal RGDP-
risk sharing, the borrowers must have less-than-average relative risk aversion and borrowers 
must have more than average relative risk aversion.  For example, it would mean families with 
children that borrow money to buy a home with a mortgage have less risk aversion than an older 
couple who is in essence providing the funds for this mortgage.  In other words, these families 
with children are more than happy to live more meager life styles during recessions or 
depressions (and more extravagant life styles during good times) in order that the older couple’s 
consumption is less disturbed by the recession or depression. 
Whether borrowers overall are more or less risk averse than the ultimate lenders is an 
empirical question.  In the meantime, we feel the appropriate assumption when addressing what 
the central bank should target is to assume that both borrowers and lenders have average relative 
risk aversion, in which case targeting NGDP, not the price level or inflation, will lead to Pareto-
efficient RGDP-risk sharing. 
 
V. Conclusion and Reflections 
 This paper presents and discusses two equations concerning the Pareto-efficient sharing 
of RGDP risk.  The equations demonstrate how the Pareto-efficient sharing of RGDP risk 
depends on one’s relative risk aversion, with individuals having above-average relative risk 
aversion transferring some of their RGDP risk to individuals having below-average relative risk 
aversion.  While equation (1) is easier to understand because it is in terms of the well-known 
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concept of “risk aversion,” equation (2) which is in terms of “risk tolerances” is actually more 
technically correct, although if we base (1) on the weighted harmonic mean of relative risk 
aversion coefficients, then (1) will be as technically correct as (2), although then (1) will be 
based on Koenig’s (2011) derivation rather than Eagle and Domian’s (2005) derivation.  
 This paper applied these equations to assess different central bank targets affects the 
sharing of RGDP risk.  In particular, this paper finds that NGDP targeting does result in Pareto-
efficient sharing of RGDP risk when both the borrower and lender have average relative risk 
aversion. 
 Some economists have noticed special results (such as the Pareto-efficiency of NGDP 
targeting) occurring when they assume identical constant relative risk averse utility functions.  
However, this paper shows that those special results are actually due to how an individual’s 
relative risk aversion is related to average relative risk aversion.  In particular, when we assume 
identical CRRA utility functions, we guarantee that everyone will have the same (and hence 
average) relative risk aversion. 
 The equations derived in the appendix and presented in this paper could prove useful in 
the development of new financial derivative markets such as in Athanasoulis, Stefano G. and 
Robert J. Shiller (2001), Shiller (2003), and Eagle (2005).  
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APPENDIX 
 
Each individual j has the following utility function: 
∑ ∑
= =
+
T
t
n
i
jitjtit
t
jj
t
cUcU
1 1
00 )()( λβ  (A1) 
where β is the time discount factor in common to all consumers, (.)0jU  is  individual j’s utility 
function at time 0, (.)jtU  is j’s utility function at time t, 0jc  is individual j’s consumption at time 
0, jitc  is j’s consumption in state i at time t, T is the finite horizon to this economy, nt is the 
number of states of nature at time t, and itλ  is the probably of state i occurring at time t. Since 
different consumers can have different utility functions at different times, the common time 
discount factor is not really a restrictive assumption.3 
Consumers maximize (A1) subject to the constraints that ∑∑
= =
=Ω+
T
t
n
i
jjitititj
t
yxc
1 1
00 λ and 
jitjitjit xyc +=  for all states i and future time periods t, where yj0 and yjit are j’s real income 
(endowment) at time 0 and in state i at time 0 respectively. The symbol xjit represents j’s demand 
for the state-contingent security that pays one consumption unit at time t if and only if state i 
occurs.  Also, itΩ  is the pricing kernel of the state-contingent security that delivers one 
consumption unit at time if and only if state i occurs.  Note the actual price of the state-
contingent security equals ititΩλ .  The reason economists working with state-contingent 
                                               
3
 Suppose for complete generality the discount factor varies by consumer, by state, and by time; that instead of 
)( jitjtt cUβ , consumer j’s utility is )(~ jitjttjit cUβ where U~ denotes the true utility function.  If we set our beta 
equal to one and defined )(~)( jitjttjitjitjt cUcU β≡ , our formulation would take this situation into account.  We 
chose to leave a constant time preference factor in our formulation to make it consistent with our including a time 
preference factor for the EOM universe. 
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securities break up the state-contingent security price into the probability times the pricing kernel 
is because the pricing kernel is unaffected by the different probabilities. 
A necessary condition for this optimization problem to be satisfied for all consumers is 
that for all i, j, and t, 
it
jitjt
t
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Ω
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=′
)()( 00
β
, which implies 
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for all i, j, and t (A2) 
Since j’s Pareto-efficient consumption is a function solely of aggregate supply,4 define 
the implicit function )(~ tjt Yc  to be how the Pareto-Efficient consumption by individual j at time t 
depends on aggregate supply.5  It is extremely important to recognize )(~ tjt Yc as a reduced form; 
it is not the structural consumption function.  To help us avoid this confusion, we refer to Yt as 
aggregate supply at time t, not income. 
Since equation (2) is true for all j,  
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jj
jtjt
′
′
=
′
′
 (A3) 
for j=2..m.   
                                               
4
 To see that j’s Pareto-efficient consumption allocation is solely a function of aggregate supply, let state 1 and 
state 2 be any two states where aggregate supply are the same.  State 2 could still differ from state 1 because of a 
different distribution of endowments or different probabilities.  Set tt 12 Ω=Ω .  If tjtj cc 12 =  for all j, then if (A3) 
holds for all j when i=1 then it also holds for all j when i=2 .  Also, if tjtj cc 12 =  for all j, then if markets clear for 
state 1 then they clear for state 2.  Therefore, if jtc
~ for j=1..m is the optimal consumption for one state, it is also the 
optimal consumption for another state with the same level of aggregate supply.  Therefore, the competitive-
equilibrium consumption allocation in an Arrow-Debreu economy is a function solely of aggregate supply. 
5
 There is not just one Pareto-efficient consumption allocation, but rather a continuum of such allocations, each 
corresponding to a particular allocation of endowments across states.  We can think about this Pareto-efficient 
consumption allocation as the one that corresponds to the existing allocation of endowments. 
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Derivation of Generalization of Koenig’s Equation of RGDP Sharing 
Totally differentiating (3) gives tttjt
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.  If we divide the left and 
right sides of this by the left and rights sides of (A3) respectively, we get: 
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Next, multiply the left and right sides of (4) by jtjt cc ~~−  and tt cc 11 ~~−  respectively and then 
rearrange slightly to get: 
t
t
tt
ttt
tjt
jt
jtjt
jtjtjt
c
cd
cU
cUc
c
cd
cU
cUc
1
1
11
111
~
~
)~(
)~(~
~
~
)~(
)~(~
′
′′
−
=
′
′′−
 (A5) 
Let jtΨ  be individual j’s coefficient of relative risk aversion.  Therefore, since 
)~(
)~(~)(~
jtjt
jtjtjt
itjt
cU
cUc
Y
′
′′−
≡Ψ  and )~(
)~(~)(~
11
111
11
tt
ttt
tt
cU
cUcY
′
′′
−
≡Ψ , we can rewrite (A5) as: 
t
t
t
tjt
jt
jt
c
cd
c
cd
1
1
1
~
~
~
~
Ψ=Ψ
 (A6) 
Now solve (A6) for 
jt
jt
c
cd
~
~
 to get: 
t
t
jt
t
jt
jt
c
cd
c
cd
1
11
~
~
~
~
~
~
Ψ
Ψ
=
 (A7) 
 
Now, take the equilibrium condition, t
m
j
jt Yc =∑
=1
~
, and totally differentiate to get t
m
j
jt dYcd =∑
=1
~
. 
Now divide both sides by Yt to get 
t
t
m
j t
jt
Y
dY
Y
cd
=∑
=1
~
.  Finally, for each term within the summation 
sign, multiply by 
jt
jt
c
c
~
~
 and rearrange slightly to get: 
t
t
m
j jt
jt
t
jt
Y
dY
c
cd
Y
c
=∑
=1
~
~~
 (A8) 
Next, substitute (A7) into (A8) to get: 
t
t
m
j t
t
jt
t
t
jt
Y
dY
c
cd
Y
c
=
Ψ
Ψ
∑
=1 1
11
~
~
~
~~
 (A9) 
Solving for 
t
t
c
cd
1
1
~
~
, we get  
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∑
=
Ψ
Ψ
=
m
j jt
t
t
jt
t
t
t
t
Y
c
Y
dY
c
cd
1
11
1
~
~~~
~
 (A10) 
Now, multiply both sides by t1
~1 Ψ  to get: 
t
t
m
j jtt
jt
t
t
t
Y
dY
Y
cc
cd
∑
=
Ψ
Ψ
=
1
1
1
1
~
1~
~
1
~
~
 (A11) 
Now, substitute this into (A7) and simplify to get: 
t
t
m
j jtt
jt
jt
jt
jt
Y
dY
Y
cc
cd
∑
=
Ψ
Ψ
=
1
1~
1
~
~
 (A12) 
This equation is this paper’s generalization of Koenig’s equation (4) and is  is one of the two 
equations of RGDP risk sharing.  The reciprocal of one’s relative risk aversion is one’s relative 
risk tolerance.  Therefore, the term ∑
=
Ψ
m
j jtt
jt
Y
c
1
1~
 is the weighted average of all consumers’ relative 
risk tolerances using the ratio of their consumption to RGDP as the weights. 
To make this even simpler, define 
∑
=
Ψ
Ψ
≡Φ
m
j jtt
jt
jt
jt
Y
c
1
1~
1
~
, which means how j’s relative risk 
tolerance compares to the average relative risk tolerance. 
Using this definition of relative risk tolerance, we can rewrite (A12) as equation (2), 
which we present in the main body of the paper: 
 
Derivation of Domian-Eagle’s Equation of RGDP Sharing: 
Since equation (A3) is true for all j,  
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)(
)~(
)(
)~(
0,10,1
11
00 cU
cU
cU
cU
tt
jj
jtjt
′
′
=
′
′
 (A13) 
for j=2..m.  Totally differentiating (A13) with respect to Yt gives
t
ttt
t
jt
jj
jtjt
dY
cd
cU
cU
dY
cd
cU
cU 1
0,10,1
11
00
~
)(
)~(~
)(
)~(
′
′′
=
′
′′
.  
If we divide the left and right sides of this by the left and rights sides of (15) respectively, we 
get: 
t
t
tt
tt
t
jt
jtjt
jtjt
dY
cd
cU
cU
dY
cd
cU
cU 1
11
11
~
)~(
)~(~
)~(
)~(
′
′′
=
′
′′
 (A14) 
Define 
( )( )
( )( )tjtjt
tjtjt
tjt YcU
YcU
Ya
~
~
)(~
′
′′
−≡ , which is j’s coefficient of relative risk aversion at time t as a 
function aggregate supply.   Multiplying both sides of (A14) by a minus sign and rearranging 
slightly gives: 
jt
t
t
t
t
jt
a
a
dY
cd
dY
cd
~
~
~
~
1
1
=  (A15) 
By summing both sides of (A15) over all consumers, we get: 
∑
∑
=
=
=
m
j jt
t
t
t
m
j t
jt
a
a
dY
cd
dY
cd
1
1
1
1
~
1
~
~
~
 (A16) 
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By equilibrium in the market for the consumption good at time t, ∑
=
=
m
j
tjt Yc
1
, which also implies 
that ∑
=
=
m
j t
jt
dY
dc
1
1.   Therefore, solving (A16) for 
t
t
dY
cd 1~ gives 
∑
=
=
m
j jt
t
t
t
a
a
dY
cd
1
11
~
1
~
1
~
.  This and (A15) imply 
that the following is true for all j.  
∑
=
=
m
j jt
jt
t
jt
a
a
dY
cd
1
~
1
~
1
~
 (A17)  
This result was first derived by Wilson (1968, see his theorem 5). 
Define the function ( )tjt YΨ~  to be individual j’s coefficient of relative risk aversion as a 
function of aggregate supply.  ( ) )(~)(~~ tjttjttjt YaYcY −=Ψ .  Next, we need to determine the value of 
( )tt YΨ , which is the weighted average of all individuals’ coefficients of relative risk aversion 
using the 
t
jt
dY
cd~
 for each j as weights.  The following starts out with the definition of ( )tt YΨ , then 
substitutes in the definition of ( )tjt YΨ~  and (A17): 
 
( ) ( )
∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
=
=
=












⋅=





⋅Ψ≡Ψ
m
k kt
m
j
jtm
j
m
k kt
jt
jtjt
m
j t
jt
tjttt
a
c
a
a
ac
dY
cd
YY
1
1
1
1
1
~
1
~
~
1
~
1
~~
~
~
 
However, the sum of consumption across all consumers in this pure exchange economy 
equals aggregate supply for that period.  Therefore, 
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( )
∑
=
=Ψ
m
j jt
t
tt
a
YY
1
~
1  (A18) 
 Define 
( )
( )tt
tjt
tj Y
Y
Y
Ψ
Ψ
≡
~
)(~α , we can write tjjt Ψ=Ψ α~~  and then replace jtΨ~ with jtjt ac ~~ and tΨ  
with (A18) to get 
∑
=
=
m
j jt
t
jtjtjt
a
Y
ac
1
~
1
~~~ α .  Dividing both sides by tjtYa~ gives 
∑
=
=
m
j jt
jt
jt
t
jt
a
a
Y
c
1
~
1
~
1
~
~
α .  
Using (A17), we can rewrite this as: 
t
jt
jt
t
jt
dY
cd
Y
c ~
~
~
α= .  Dividing both sides by jtα~  gives: 
( )
t
jt
jt
tjt Y
c
Yc
~
~
1
~
α
=′  (A19) 
Recognize that another way to write ( )tjt Yc ′~  is 
t
jt
dY
dc
, therefore another way to write (A19) is: 
t
jt
jtt
jt
Y
c
dY
cd ~
~
1~
α
=  (A20) 
If we multiply both sides by jtt cdY ~ , we get equation (1) that we present in the main body of the 
paper. 
 
